By FRANK BAJAK, AP
Last updated: 7:27 am
July 4, 2008
Posted: 3:42 am
July 4, 2008
The plan was nothing if not audacious: A turncoat persuades rebels to bring together their most prized hostages and march them 90 miles through Colombia's wilderness. A month later, disguised commandos primed with acting lessons land in a helicopter and trick the rebels into handing them over.
The mission was to rescue three U.S. military contractors, former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and 11 others held captive in the Colombian jungles.
Its success hinged entirely, its planners said Thursday, on a near-total breakdown in communications between the isolated guerrilla jailers and their commanders - the net result of years of intense U.S.-Colombian military cooperation that has seriously weakened Latin America's last major rebel army.
That, and a bit of revenge.
"When I first got briefed, I said, 'This is realistic? Can this truly work?' U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield told The Associated Press. "And obviously, the answer was yes."
Wednesday's expertly choreographed rescue had its genesis in the escape last year of a Colombian who had spent time in captivity with the three Americans and Betancourt.
But it began to gain steam only in January, when Colombian intelligence determined that the hostages were being moved, said Gen. Freddy Padilla, Colombia's armed forces chief.
The Colombians installed U.S.-provided remote-controlled video monitoring devices - which can zoom in and out - along rivers that are the only transport route through dense jungles, U.S. and Colombian officials said. U.S. surveillance planes intercepted rebel radio and satellite phone conversations and employed foliage-penetrating imagery, they said.
In mid-February, a Colombian patrol spotted the three Americans - Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell and Thomas Howes - bathing in the Apoporis River under guard, the first sight of the Americans since their surveillance plane crashed in 2003.
For four days, "We had eyes on them," Brownfield said.
But a rescue operation was deemed too risky and called off.
"The president's order was: rescue, yes, but without even a drop of blood," said a Colombian army general directly involved in the mission, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to disclose details.
The general said a disgruntled member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, had agreed to spearhead the operation. This turncoat, he said, was trusted by both the rebels' high command and by the leader of the 1st Front, which was holding the hostages.
"The FARC's communications are medieval," Padilla said. He said its command-and-control is so diminished that it sends important messages by courier. This breakdown in the chain of command has made it easier to flip disillusioned rebels to the government's side, and indeed, Padilla said more than one double agent was involved in this mission.
But the turncoat was the key. He convinced Gerardo Aguilar Ramirez, alias Cesar, the commander of the 1st Front, that top commanders wanted the 15 hostages moved to a rallying point, the general directly involved in the operation told the AP.
The turncoat was upset with the FARC because his own commander had taken a house and farm away from him, the general said. This was payback.
